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PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, AND EVERYDAY
LIFE IN THE SECOND SEX: THE CURRENT
BEAUVOIR REVNAL
In her interviews with Sartre, published posthumously in La
Ceremonie des Adieux (Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre), Simone de
Beauvoir largely seems to share Sartre' s belief that philosophy is one
thing, literature another. In these conversations of 1974, Sartre
enumerates some of the differences: for example, philosophy, he
claims, can be written with ease, even under the influence of drugs-he
himself had consumed great quantities of Corydrane while composing
his mammoth Critique ofDialectical Reason; good literature, on the
other hand, usually requires aseries of drafts. 1 Both Sartre and
Beauvoir appear to accept here a conventional distinction that is based
on an essentialist conception of genres of writing, but it is one which in
practice they continually put in question. My first aim in this essay is to
challenge the distinction itself, at least in the rigid form in which Sartre
and Beauvoir understand it. My second aim is to explore the basis of
Beauvoir' s position in light of what she says about philosophy in her
important autobiographical The Prime ofLife. My third and final aim is
to discuss the current Beauvoir revival, or rather first awakening of
interest in Beauvoir as a philosopher that is reflected in numerous
recent books, articles, conferences, and symposia and largely centers on
The Second Sex.
The Philosophy-Literature Dichotomy
In accepting the conventional philosophy-literature dichotomy,
Sartre and Beauvoir were insufficiently reflective. I will offer some
narrative rather than formal arguments to support this claim. But first
let me insist on what I am not arguing. I do not dispute the possibility
of rating quality of style. Sartre' s Critique 01Dialectical Reason, for
example, contains passages that are abominable from a stylistic point of
view, and, as indicated above, Sartre offers one excuse for this. Good
style, I would like to think, enhances rather than undermines solid
philosophical thinking, especially if one allows it to take a plurality of
1. Simone de Beauvoir, Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre, trans. P. O'Brian
(New York: Pantheon, 1984)174.
forms. 2 The Second Sex in particular illustrates my point. It is indeed a
work of considerable philosophical significance but it is also written in
a very pleasing French, especially the second half, Book 2, "L'
Experience Vecue" according to the French original-"Woman's Life
Today" as the justly maligned English translation calls it. It consists of
descriptions-philosophically ordered descriptions, as I shall insist-of
ordinary life as women experience it at different stages and/or in
different occupations.
On both sides of the Atlantic there has recently appeared a
spate of literature-"philosophicalliterature" in common English
parlance-that addresses the role of narrative in philosophy.3 Against
Aristotle' s famous assertion of the ancient quarrel (ancient in his own
time, of course) between philosophy and history, many of our
contemporaries seem to claim that philosophy is nothing but a sort of
conscious or unconscious history. Even among Anglo-American
analytic philosophers it has become con1ßlonplace to use the expression
"to tell a story" when characterizing one or another philosophical
theory. Simultaneously, the sub-field philosophy-in-literature
(identified with the work of Martha Nussbaum, among others) has
achieved considerable recognition in the United States. And in contrast
to only a few decades ago, fewer philosophers consider it terrible form
any more to weave autobiographical remarks into essays purporting to
deal with philosophical topics. After all, the so-called "father of
modem philosophy," Rene Descartes hirnself, did so on a grand scale in
bis Discours de La Methode!
In this context, I have a narrative of my own to offer. My first
year after college and during the heyday of Sartrean-Beauvoirean
existentialism, I attended philosophy courses in LilIe. Jean Grenier,
Camus' former teacher and friend, asked me to do a class report on
Wittgenstein' s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a copy of which had
2. Brand Blanshard, one of my former teachers, wrote a short essay On
Philosophical Style (Manchester (UK): Manchester University Press,
1954).
3. See for example David Carr's Time, Narrative, and History
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). Carr is strongly
indebted to Edmund Husserl's The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology.
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just been acquired by the department ~ s library. After the session, a
French graduate student came up to me to thank me for my
presentation, but French philosophy students, he added, had too much
of a literary bent to be comfortable with that kind of nlaterial. In
retrospect, I see the double or tripie irony of this moment. First there
are the Bachelards, father and daughter. Suzanne Bachelard, the French
translator of Husserl' s early, more logic-oriented work, was also
teaching one of my courses. Some years aga I learned from Genevieve
Sevel that the two of them had been students of Simone de Beauvoir' s
in 1942-43 during Beauvoir's last year of lycee teaching. Suzanne
Bachelard tended to be extremely formalistic and non-literary in her
approach to her subject, the philosophy of logic--during the very years
when her father, Gaston Bachelard, greatly influenced the Anglo-
American literary theory movement known as The New Criticism!
Second and conversely, we now know that Wittgenstein's own cultural
formation, Weltanschauung, and form of life-more bizarre and
unconventional in certain respects than pure fiction-shaped his
philosophical writings, particularly the Tractatus, in ways of which
most of us were unaware. In short, the philosophy/literature/life
interrelationships were stronger and more complex than any of us reaBy
understood... But I digress: after aB, this is supposed to be an essay in
philosophy, not a "mere" narrative.
I trust that my basic point is clear. In the portion of their
dialogue to which I have aBuded, Sartre and Beauvoir were affected by
a prejudice that has been part of the socialization of philosophy students
almost everywhere up to the present, even if it is being enforced less
rigorously now: philosophy is one thing, literature another, and life, to
which both genres refer in different ways, yet a third. Philosophy, so
this story goes, is further removed from life than literature, yet good
philosophy is also closer to life because like life it is real and true.4
Literature, however, i.e. most prose literature (which to some extent
includes history and biography, which are inevitably distortive),
remains at the level of fiction. This preconception influenced Sartre
even though he always insisted on being concrete in philosophy, deftly
used phenomenological descriptions to support broad philosophical
generalizations in even his earliest works, and finally discovered le
vecu-a discovery which he himself acknowledged to have occurred
4. In this context, one should recall the title of Sartre's posthumously-
published short work ofthe late 1940s, Verile et Existence.
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some time after the publication of Being and Nothingness, and which
many Beauvoir scholars, now reinforced by Margaret Simons' research
on some of Beauvoir' s early diaries, have tended to attribute primarily
to the latter' s influence.5 Verbally Beauvoir subscribed to the same
preconception. She even defended it explicitly. At the same time, her
short 1946 essay "Litterature et Metaphysique" strongly endorsed the
idea of the existentialist novel with philosophical import.6 I would like
to claim, however, that The Second Sex and other Beauvoirean works
that abound with similarly broad philosophical generalizations are less
subject to this prejudice than Sartre' s.
Of course, much more would need to be said in order to
generate a comprehensive theory of the relationships among
philosophy, literature, and life out of the writings of our heroine and
hero. Above all, there is the issue of transcendence in all of its many
meanings, only some of which are captured by Sartre' sand Beauvoir' s
usages of the term-usages which themselves differ significantly
between the two of them. That is, great philosophy in some manner
always transcends the level of daily life, and "transcendence" always
carries a connotation of the ecstatic and timeless, even when employed
by unequivocally non-religious writers such as Beauvoir and Sartre.
But, I would maintain, so does great prose fiction such as the work of
Dostoevsky.
Beauvoir's Understanding of Philosophies as Systems
In "Simone de Beauvoir Writing the Self," Jo-Ann Pilardi cites
a passage from La Force de l' Age (The Prime ofLife) that strikes me
as very important. Beauvoir explains there why she decided to pursue a
literary career in which she could exhibit her originality rather than
5. Sartre acknowledges this in the interview "The Itinerary of a
Thought," which was originally published in New Left Review in 1969.
See Jean-Pau1 Sartre: Between Existentialism and Marxism, trans. J.
Mathews (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1974) 41-42.
See also my discussion of this in "Sartre and Lived Experience,"
Research in Phenomeno1ogy XI (1981): 75-89. The reference to the
notion of lived experience in Beauvoir's 1927 diaries can be found in
Margaret A. Simons, Beauvoir and The Second Sex (Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield, 1999) 205.
6. See Les Temps Modemes 1,7 (avriI1946): 1153-1163.
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attempt to be a philosopher, and she offers us insight into what she
understands by this term. These reflections of 1960 are essentially
consistent with what she told Margaret Simons and Jessica Benjamin in
a 1979 interview, published in Simons' recent volume of essays.
Simons, much of whose career has been devoted to establishing
Beauvoir' s credentials as a philosopher in the face of the latter' s
obstinate refusal to admit them, pressed her once again on that occasion
and extracted from her the opinion that each century produces perhaps
two great philosophers, people such as Descartes, Hegel and, in her
estimation, Sartre. The two Americans suggested that in the United
States "philosophy" has a rather different, broader meaning, even if it is
considered difficult by the typical reader, and Beauvoir at least
conceded that her own sense of the word was "slightly elevated.,,7
Thanks to Pilardi's reference I returned to La Force de l' Age
with heightened interest. As it happens, I was studying it on a day on
which a student in my existentialism class reported on Robert Denoon
Cumming' s Phenomeno1ogy and Deconstruction. In this book,
Cumming raises questions about the very nature of philosophy and
especially "schools" of philosophy. Partly because Sartre first leamed
of Husserl' s philosophy through Emmanuel Levinas' misleading
Doctoral dissertation, according to Cumming, Sartre never really
understood phenomenology. Although grossly exaggerated,
Cumming' s claim echoes the passage in The Prime 01Life where
Beauvoir reports Sartre always to have said that she understood other
thinkers, Husserl in particular, more quickly and more accurately than
he, an assessment with which she agrees. It is precisely for this reason,
she continues, that she never feIt capable of being original as a
philosopher in the special, elevated sense of systern-builder. Then she
continues with the words Pilardi cites:
It would be more useful to explain how certain individuals are
capable of getting results from that conscious venture into lunacy
known as a 'philosophical system,' fronl which they derive that
obsessional attitude which endows their tentative patterns with
universal insight and applicability. As I have rernarked before,
wornen are not by nature prone to obsessions of this type.8
7. Simons 11.
8. Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime 01Life, trans. P. Green (Cleveland:
World Publishing CornpanylMeridian Books, 1966) 178. Pilardi's
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Immediately after she adds that she might have decided to
become a writer of secondary philosophicalliterature, a disciple in the
sense in which Eugen Fink was a self-conscious disciple of Husserl' s.
She is confident that she would have been good at it, but she says she
dismissed this option as a not especially interesting occupation, a career
choice that she found puzzling. In the same breath, however, Beauvoir
admits to having agreed to play this role "intermittently" in her later
career-obviously with regard to Sartre, although Beauvoir does not
name him. At this point the English translation adds the words "for
various reasons." Instead of having her say, as she does in French, that
later on it came about that she agreed to do so (il m' est arrive de
consentir),9 it reads that later she came to do it. To be sure, these are
subtle deviations, but they prompted me to examine more carefully the
passage cited by Pilardi in the French original.
Instead of addressing the silly or useless question as to why
she herself did not become one of those rare creatures who are original
philosophers, Beauvoir writes:
il fa udrait plut6t expliquer comment certains individus sont
capables de mener a bien ce delire concerte qu' est un
systeme et d' ou leur vient l'entetement qui donne aleurs
aper(us la valeur de cles universelles. J' ai dit deja que la
conditionfeminine ne dispose pas a ce genre d' obstination.
Once again there are subtle variations between the French
original and the English translation; they interest me, and I hope they
will be of general interest, for reasons that are not merely linguistic.
First of all, the translation has it right when it has her say that such
individuals "get results," mener a bien. But to translate "delire" as
"lunacy" is a little strong; it is rather closer to the English "delirium,"
"Sirnone de Beauvoir Writing the Self' was first presented at a session
of the Simone de Beauvoir Circle, Central Division, American
Philosophieal Association, in May 1999 in New Orleans. It is a
synopsis of her book-Iength study, Simone de Beauvoir Writing the
Self: Philosophy Becomes Autobiography (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1999).
9. Beauvoir, La Force de l' Age (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) 229. The
citation under consideration begins on page 228.
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which is different from insanity. Also Beauvoir qualifies her expression
with the adjective "eoneerte," which means deliberate or focused. The
English text speaks of a "conscious venture into lunacy"-not quite,
though almost, the same thing as "focused delirium." But the more
dubious parts of this translation are to be found in the remainder of the
sentence. First, "entetement" clearly means "stubbornness" or
"obstinacy," a point that is reinforced by Beauvoir' s use of the word
"obstination" at the end of the following sentence. In the English
translation this becomes "obsession" with Freudian overtones that are
entirely absent from the original. And whereas the formulation
"tentative patterns" is not entirely unsuccessful at capturing "aper~us,"
which means something like "rough judgments," "universal insight and
applicability" misses the original' s philosophical significance by
erasing the sarcasm and skepticism the phrase "la valeur de eIes
universelles" carries from an existentialist perspective even while
appearing on the surface to reinforce the initial idea that such systems
"get results." After all, for an existentialist of either the Sartrean or the
Beauvoirean type values are created, not found in any imagined "nature
of things." Hence, finally, for the English translation to render the
words "la condition feminine" as "Women...by nature" is to do
significant violence to the opening assertion of The Seeond Sex, to wit,
that one is not a woman by nature ("One is not born a woman"), but
rather beeomes one.
The first thing to be said about this highly revealing passage is
that it is a great example of a quality I have always admired in both
Beauvoir and Sartre but that is more developed in Beauvoir: her
enormous straightforwardness, her willingness to express exactly what
she means without, as the unfortunate English metaphor has it, "pulling
her punches." Of course, you need not agree with her, but you know
exactly where she stands, at least on the literallevel. This same text
also shows her slightly bemused sense of self-doubt and of doubt about
others-in this case the "great" systematic philosophers. How great
were/are they really? She does not call them lunatics, but she does raise
serious doubts about the truth-value of their entire enterprise, rare as
that enterprise may be. She certainly implies disbelief in the idea that
any one of them, Sartre included, has achieved or could ever achieve
universal truth----even though they all, or at least many of them, have a
value inasmuch as they offer some "universal keys" or clues. In a
sense, doesn't she express satisfaction at her self-confessed incapacity
to be like them? An heiress to the "feminine condition," she is not
prone to "obstinacy" the way they, all male, are. Obstinacy usually is
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not considered an admirable quality, and the French "entetement" she
uses first has perhaps an even less positive connotation.
In sum, Beauvoir's language indicates that what these greats
think they are doing when they give us a system is a self-delusion on
their Palt. And this strikes me as something very "heavy." I see no way
of characterizing her attitude toward Sartre here-as long as we take
this passage at face value-as anything other than patronizing: the poor
dear-brilliant but stubborn and deluded. Sartre, like the others before
him, she suggests, is engaging in an impressive and potentially useful
enterprise (as we all know, Beauvoir often employs technical,
systematic terms from Sartre's philosophy, such as "in-itself', to
illuminate ideas in her own writings), but ultimately it all constitutes a
form of self-deception. By virtue of being a woman, even if she was
not born one in the philosophically suspect sense, she claims to have
been somewhat inoculated against this folly. Although I am not a
woman, I have always shared Beauvoir' s attitude about great
philosophical systems; at the same time the perhaps typical American in
me (as Simons and Benjamin would have it) questions her equation of
such systems with philosophy as a whole. Having thus clarified
Beauvoir' s understanding of "philosophy" and her rationale for
accepting the misleading dichotomy between philosophy and literature,
let us now turn to the philosophical greatness of The Second Sex and the
current renascence of interest in it.
The Current Apotheosis of The Second Sex
Recent books, articles, and symposia on Simone de Beauvoir
as a philosopher have of course not taken The Second Sex as their sole
focus. Among other works of special importance, one must first, as all
would agree, consider her nearly contemporaneous Pour une Morale de
I' Ambiguile, misleadingly translated as is so common with Beauvoir's
tides (though not in the case of The Second Sex itself, where the
mistranslations begin after the tide page) as The Ethics ofAmbiguity.
Some scholars, notably Debra Bergoffen,10 find much value in
Beauvoir"s earlier ethical essay Pyrrhus et Cineas despite the somewhat
dismissive attitude Beauvoir herself took towards it in later years
because of its excessively idealistic, optimistic tone. Kate Fullbrook
10. Debra Bergoffen, The Philosophy ofSimone de Beauvoir:
Gendered Phenomenologies, Erotic Generosities (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1997).
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and Edward Fullbrook, whose strong anti-Sartre bias and resulting
polemics have perhaps deflected attention from the strength and depth
of their scholarship on Beauvoir, have paid special attention to her
novel L' invitee (She Came to Stay), published in 1943 two months
after Sartre's L' etre et le neant, and present it as the source of a
number of key concepts to be found in the latter. ll Beauvoir' s other
novels as weIl as her extensive autobiographical writings, letters, essays
and, as I mentioned, her early diaries also have been mined for their
philosophical significance. On the other hand, her major study of old
age lLl vieillesse (The Coming ofAge), which bears numerous, almost
uncanny, resemblances to The Second Sex and certainly merits serious
scholarly consideration has, to the best of my knowledge, undergone
surprisingly litde philosophical analysis.
But in the new scholarship on Beauvoir as a philosopher that
characterizes the last half-decade or so, The Second Sex is most
celebrated and analyzed the most and, I think, righdy so. What explains
this proliferation? First there is the fact that 1999 marked the fiftieth
anniversary of its original publication in Paris. Moreover, in the space
of only a few years a number of the leading scholars of this
renascence-Margaret Simons, Debra Bergoffen, Jo-Ann Pilardi,
Kristana Arp, Soma Kruks, Eleanore Holveck, Karin Vintges, and Eva
Lundgren-Gothlin, among others-have either brought to completion
their own original works or, in the case of the last two, supervised
translations of their books into English. Special attention also needs to
be paid, as it frequently is in infomlal settings but less often in print, to
Margaret Simons' longstanding and tireless efforts to shame the
members of the American Philosophical Association and especially the
large Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy into
acknowledging the sexist bias that used to keep Beauvoir's name and
work excluded from the philosophical canons they guarded. 12 (Simons
11. Kate Fullbrook and Edward Fullbrook, Simone de Beauvoir and
Jean-Paul Sartre: The Remaking ofa Twentieth-Century Legend
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993).
12. See her "Sexism and the Philosophical Canon: On Reading
Beauvoir's The Second Sex," in Journal ofthe History ofIdeas LI (July
1990): 487-504; reprinted as Chapter 8 of Beauvoir and The Second
Sex, 101-114. I discuss these efforts in more detail in "The
Globalization of Philosophy," the final chapter of my book From
40
must also be credited with spearheading an arrangement with Indiana
University Press that will result in aseries of scholarly editions of .
Beauvoir"s work in English translation. It will include first-time
translations of a number of essays and other writings, such as
"Litterature et Metaphysique" and Pyrrhus et Cineas, but probably no
revised translation of The Seeond Sex, for which the current copyright
holder long refused to waive its rights.)
No doubt, academic fads and vogues-those very concrete and
powerful factors in the history of ideas about which most intellectuals
as their bearers reflect only with some reluctance-are also at work.
Many younger feminist theorists did not read The Seeond Sex in their
formative years because in the circles in which they moved it was
considered passe in many, if only vaguely articulated, respects: too
pessimistic about women' s future possibilities because rooted in the
French scene of the 1940s, subservient to the philosophy of the
despised Sartre (a claim that ironically echoes Beauvoir' s most
misogynist early critics), and above all, characterized by the type of
grand narrative in the Hegelian tradition that postmodernism (according
to the new grand narrative) had finally transcended. But the Aliee in
Wonderland world of intellectual faddism tends, among other things, to
be somewhat pendulum-like. The exhaustion or at least waning of
postmodernism has created space for reconsidering what preceded it.
Early in 2000 in France, there was even a new Sartre fad, generated in
part by the surprise publication of philosophical media celebrity
Bemard-Henri Levy's new major book on Sartre. It would be a
distortion of fact to deny that the Beauvoir revival has received some of
its impetus from similar factors. 13
Yugoslav Praxis to Global Pathos: Anti-Hegemonie Post-Post-Marxist
Essays (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
13. An excellent example ofthis, which also brings into play my
previous candidate for explaining the renascence, is Scott Heller' s
article "Scholars Seek to Rank Simone de Beauvoir Among Leading
20th-Century Philosophers: Was the Author of 'The Second Sex' Jean-
Paul Sartre's Mouthpiece or His Muse?" in The Chroniele ofHigher
Edueation, September 4, 1998, pp. A22-A23. Taking as its point of
departure a session on Beauvoir that was held during the quinquennial
World Congress of Philosophy in Boston in August 1998, it includes
photographs of Beauvoir herself and of Margaret Simons. More
recently, just to close the media circle so to speak, IR Monde carried an
41
Let me conclude, however, as a professional philosopher who
likes to think that at least sometimes intellectual attention is brought to
bear on certain works because of their intrinsic merit, by indicating just
why The Second Sex ought to be considered a "breakthrough" work in
philosophy. The Second Sex strikes me as paradigmatic with regard to
bridging or overcoming the traditional philosophy-literature dichotomy.
The heart of Beauvoir' s method is to be found in Book 2, "Lived
Experience." (Book 1 is a very interesting but more traditional
admixture of philosophical criticism-critiques of biological,
psychoanalytic, and Marxist determinisms-historical reconstruction,
and literary analysis). There Beauvoir deploys a descriptive method
that is clearly indebted to Husserl' s but operates without the constraints
of the strictest form of bis epoche, or bracketing-out of existence
claims, the possibility and validity of which already had been strongly
and in my view convincingly challenged, especially by Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir'ls colleague and acquaintance.
Within the traditions of modem Western philosophy, Sartre
and Merleau-Ponty as post-Husserlian phenomenologists first elevated
sexuality in different but not entirely incompatible ways to the status of
a philosophically important category and gave it a significance that
went much beyond the simpler, usually brief (and ultimately anti-
feminist) explorations of the social effects of gender inequality one
finds in writers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Heget. Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty were also influenced by Freud, even ifthey strongly
disagreed with various aspects of his theory-Merleau-Ponty with
Freud's insistence that sexuality fundamentally shapes all human
interaction, and Sartre with Freud' s simplistic and rigid metaphysics,
which tends to elevate concepts such as the super-ego and the
unconscious to the status of allegedly real entities. But the terms both
of these philosopbical contemporaries of Beauvoir use to write about
sexuality range from neuter or neutral (as if the question of sexuality
could be dissociated from an individual's sexual identity) to clearly (but
unavowedly) male-biased, and in the last analysis both remain
article about the annual two-day meetings of the Groupe d' Etudes
Sartriennes in June 2000 in Paris that mentioned Levy's appearance at
the opening session but devoted more space to the special session on
Beauvoir, at wluch Simons and Lundgren-Gothlin, among others, were
speakers. (Jean Birnbaum, "Trois spectres chez les Sartriens," Le
Monde, 30 juin 2000, p. XII.)
42
complacent about the status quo in this domain of existence.14
Beauvoir' s breakthrough consists in at once acknowledging and
asserting the inescapable importance of the biological sexual
differences between men and women, subtly showing on virtually every
page how human society' s collective interpretations of the practical
implications of these differences (rather than, as in Freud, the mere
male-female difference itself) permeate all facets of women' s lives, and
yet maintaining, over hundreds of pages, a fiercely critical stance
toward past and contemporary practices on the basis of an unshakable
conviction that the biological differences do not, logically speaking,
lead to conservative, essentialist practical implications with respect to
most aspects of everyday life. No writer before her, whether
philosopher or author of fiction, had done this in such a sustained and
systematic way, linking ontological issues about what is contingent and
what is necessary in human existence with deft accounts of detailed
experiences in the lives of concrete individuals, all from the standpoint
of a committed social critic. Nor has anyone done so since.
So the prejudices that during the Carter and Reagan years and
through the first Bush dynasty often prevented younger feminists from
taking Beauvoir and The Second Sex more seli.ously than as an
important historical milestone, no longer worth reading for its own
sake, have gradually been recognized as, for the most part, mere
prejudices. Is The Second Sex really pessimistic? Some of the sobering
"data of biology" in the first chapter of Book 1 came from school
14. The chapter "The Body in its Sexual Being" in Merleau-Ponty' s
Phenomenology ofPereeption , trans. C. Smith (London & New York:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962) 154-173, is remarkable both for its
strong insistence on the ambiguity of this phenomenon, so much in
keeping with Beauvoir' s overall philosophical perspective, and for its
failure to explore the implications of sexual differences in any but the
most superficial way. Sartre's bolder and better-known analysis of
"Concrete Relations with Others" could be taken as neutral, since he
uses the non-gender-specific pronoun "Autrui" to refer to the object of
"my" sexual behaviors, but his English translator, Hazel Barnes,
translates these passages as if this Other were female, because, she says,
"The feminine sounds more natural in English": Being and Nothingness
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1956) 390. It sounds that way, of
course, because Sartre for the most part envisages these behaviors from
a male standpoint.
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textbooks used during Beauvoir" s adolescence. They were indeed
fallacious and, as Margaret Simons showed in her Doctoral thesis,
penneated with sexist presuppositions. But even these alleged data
failed to curb Beauvoir' s optimism about future possibilities. Anyone
who completes reading both volumes of The Second Sex and imbibes in
particular the spirit of the last two chapters, "The Independent Woman"
and the "Conclusion," will agree with that. Does Beauvoir merely
faithfully "apply" Sartre's or, for that matter, Merleau-Ponty's ideas to
an area about which they had little or nothing to say? By no means.
Nor does saying so deny or denigrate the intimate collaboration and
intellectual cross-fertilization among the three of them. Tout compte
fait, however, The Second Sex is profoundly original and creative. And
finally, does the text present an account that falls under the now highly
problematized category of "grand narrative"? Yes-if this is taken to
include any work that employs theoretical generalizations, a criterion
that would anathematize all works of theory. In fact, however,
Beauvoir's approach in Book 2 of The Second Sex is paradigmatically
"postmodern" in its insistence on the historical contingency and
alterability of the phenomena of women' s lived experience that it
describes with such comprehensiveness,jinesse, and style. Happily,
some of the more repressive of these phenomena of life in late 1940s
France since have disappeared through complex historical processes in
which Beauvoir"s ideas and example played a not insignificant role.
But many other aspects-repressive or empowering-of women's lived
experience that Beauvoir describes with such philosophical profundity
and literary eloquence have not. The present intellectual celebration of
The Second Sex is therefore thoroughly appropriate for our millennial
time.
Purdue University William McBride
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